Strategic learning and its limits

Book

Provides a theoretical framework for thinking about strategic learning and highlights achievements in the theoretical literature on learning in games. Characterizes the long-run behavior of different kinds of learning rules, addressing whether they converge to--or at least tend toward--something that can be construed as an equilibrium of the game. Discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement learning and learning procedures which rely on regret; alternative notions of both convergence and equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing. Young is Scott and Barbara Black Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University and Professorial Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford. Index.

Authors: Young, H

• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Host title: Arne Ryde Memorial Lectures 2002
• Place of publication: Oxford and New York
• Publication date: 2004-01-01
• ISBN: 0-19-926918-1
• Language: English