Working paper icon

Working paper

Bribing voters

Abstract:

We show how an outside party offering incentives to voters can manipulate at no cost collective decisions made through voting. Under influence, these decisions can become inefficient. Therefore, the market for policies may be more likely to fail than the markets for goods, because (democratic) politics involves influence and collective decisions to a greater extent than markets for goods do. We develop and use a model to analyze different incentive schemes, credibility situations, and payoff ...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published

Actions


Access Document


Files:

Authors


Publisher:
University of Oxford
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2000-10-01
Paper number:
39
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1144386
Local pid:
pubs:1144386
Deposit date:
2020-12-15

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP