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The love of truth

Abstract:

It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense-that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation-it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, I argue that this view is untenable. The tru...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.10.003

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, HUM, Philosophy, Philosophy Postholders
Journal:
STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Volume:
41
Issue:
4
Pages:
422-432
Publication date:
2010-12-05
DOI:
EISSN:
1879-2510
ISSN:
0039-3681
URN:
uuid:f632eb36-974a-42ab-9e05-75a1efe4497f
Source identifiers:
146428
Local pid:
pubs:146428
Language:
English
Keywords:

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