Central bank liquidity and “toxic asset” auctions.

Paul Klemperer

Abstract:

The crisis set policymakers scrambling for appropriate mechanisms to respond to financial turmoil. This column proposes a new auction design that can be used for toxic asset purchases and central bank liquidity auctions in a credit crunch.

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APA Style

Klemperer, P. (2009). Central bank liquidity and “toxic asset” auctions. VoxEU.

MLA Style

Klemperer, Paul. “Central Bank Liquidity and ‘Toxic Asset’ Auctions.” VoxEU, 2009.

Chicago Style

Klemperer, Paul. 2009. “Central Bank Liquidity and ‘Toxic Asset’ Auctions.” VoxEU.
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Bibliographic Details

Journal:: VoxEU
Publication date:: 2009-09-25
URN:: uuid:f5b46570-1194-4c8f-9439-595eda6de654
Local pid:: oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14329

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Language:: English

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License:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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