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On the Theory of Strategic Voting.

Abstract:

Many analyses of plurality-rule elections predict the complete coordination of strategic voting, and hence support for only two candidates. Here I suggest that stable multi-candidate support will arise in equilibrium. A group of voters must partially coordinate behind one of two challenging candidates in order to dislodge a disliked incumbent. In a departure from existing models, the popular support for each challenger is uncertain. This support must be inferred from the private observation o...

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Volume:
186
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2004-01-01
URN:
uuid:f52eb8be-33f8-47ac-853e-926f496afd8d
Local pid:
ora:1225
Language:
English

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