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On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents.

Abstract:

A foundational assumption in economics is that people are rational--they choose optimal plans of action given their predictions about future states of the world. In games of strategy this means that each players' strategy should be optimal given his or her prediction of the opponents' strategies. We demonstrate that there is an inherent tension between rationality and prediction when players are uncertain about their opponents' payoff functions. Specifically, there are games in which it is im...

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Dean Foster More by this author
H. Peyton Young More by this author
Series:
Economics Working Papers
Publication date:
1999
URN:
uuid:f47ec3bc-5440-4693-828b-c0d8dda7a797
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11992
Language:
English

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