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Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption.

Abstract:

We study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our game-theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise. We use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on...

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Volume:
20
Series:
Research Papers
Publication date:
2009-04-05
URN:
uuid:f3e420f8-6d99-43f9-88c2-5a0a90a13b26
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12959
Language:
English

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