David Lewis's awkward cases of redundant causation

Journal article

The main line of Lewis's account of causation is in terms of chains of counterfactual dependence. According to his original account (1973), a causal chain is a sequence of two or more events, with counterfactual dependence at each step; and one event is a cause of another if there is a causal chain from one to the other. But some awkward cases involving redundant causation lead him to introduce the notion of quasi-dependence (1986: 205-7). Laurie Paul (1998) has suggested a way of dealing with one important class of these cases in terms of dependence proper. I shall suggest a different (and, I argue, preferable) way of dealing with this class of cases; I shall also suggest that it is possible to deal with other awkward cases too in terms of dependence proper.

Authors: Rice, H

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Blackwell Publishing
• Journal: Analysis
• Volume: 59
• Issue: 263
• Pages: 157–164
• Publication date: 1999-07-01
• Edition: Publisher's version
• DOI: 10.1111/1467-8284.00162
• Language: English
• Keywords: redundant causation; David Lewis; counterfactual dependence; causation
• Subjects: Philosophy