Working paper
Bundling Revisited: Substitute Products and Inter-Firm Discounts.
- Abstract:
- This paper extends the standard model of bundling to allow products to be sub- stitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, rms have an incentive to introduce a bundling discount when demand for the bundle is elastic relative to demand for stand-alone products. When products are partial substitutes, this typically gives an integrated rm a greater incentive to o¤er a bundle discount (relative to the standard model with additive preferences), while product substitutability is often the sole reason why separate sellers wish to o¤er inter- firm discounts. When separate sellers negotiate their inter- firm discount, they can use the discount to relax competition.
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(Preview, pdf, 289.8KB, Terms of use)
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Authors
- Publisher:
- Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
- Series:
- Discussion paper series
- Publication date:
- 2011-10-01
- Language:
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English
- UUID:
-
uuid:ef5574e5-1efd-478d-b6cd-3490eb0fd02a
- Local pid:
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oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:15239
- Deposit date:
-
2011-11-18
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright date:
- 2011
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