Mental fictionalism and the dangers of Cartesian apologia

Journal article

Toon (2023) argues that “the mind is a useful fiction.” The mind, for Toon, is essentially an “inner world” or “inner grotto,” which is “private” and which “houses our mental states–our beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and the rest.” His position, according to which the metaphor of mind is a “story that we cannot avoid telling” risks elevating the concept of mind to that of a “sacrosanct given.” Work in philosophy, history, and anthropology shows that talk of the states we count as “mental” is far older and far more widespread than the concept of mind or the category mental–the metaphor of mind therefore does not appear to be inevitable. A strand of anti-Cartesian philosophy argues that not only is the concept of mind avoidable, but also that it should be avoided–that it encourages a vision of human beings which is deeply impoverished and confused. This paper offers a genealogy of the concept of mind and category mental, building on work by Rorty and Wilkes, buttressed by recent work in history and anthropology. It then reconstructs some of the arguments that the concept is harmful, rather than useful, for our understanding of ourselves and the world.

Authors: Gough, J

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Journal: Philosophical Psychology
• Publication date: 2025-04-24
• Acceptance date: 2025-03-28
• DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2025.2489444
• EISSN: 1465-394X
• ISSN: 0951-5089
• Language: English
• Keywords: eliminativism; Rorty; Wilkes; fictionalism; Cartesianism; anti-Cartesianism