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When no bad deed goes punished: a relational contracting experiment in Ghana

Publication status:: Published

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APA Style

Davies, E., & Fafchamps, M. (2015). When no bad deed goes punished: a relational contracting experiment in Ghana. University of Oxford.

MLA Style

Davies, E., and M. Fafchamps. When No Bad Deed Goes Punished: a Relational Contracting Experiment in Ghana. University of Oxford, 2015.

Chicago Style

Davies, E, and M Fafchamps. 2015. “When No Bad Deed Goes Punished: a Relational Contracting Experiment in Ghana.” CSAE Working Paper Series. University of Oxford.
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Files:: csae-wps-2015-08.pdf

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Authors

+ Davies, E More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Fafchamps, M More by this author

Role:: Author

Publisher:: University of Oxford
Series:: CSAE Working Paper Series
Publication date:: 2015-01-08
Paper number:: WPS/2015-08

Pubs id:: 1144531
Local pid:: pubs:1144531
Deposit date:: 2020-12-15

Terms of use

Copyright date:: 2015
Rights statement:: Copyright 2015 The Author(s)

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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