The free-energy self: A predictive coding account of self-recognition

Journal article

Recognising and representing one's self as distinct from others is a fundamental component of self-awareness. However, current theories of self-recognition are not embedded within global theories of cortical function and therefore fail to provide a compelling explanation of how the self is processed. We present a theoretical account of the neural and computational basis of self-recognition that is embedded within the free-energy account of cortical function. In this account one's body is processed in a Bayesian manner as the most likely to be “me”. Such probabilistic representation arises through the integration of information from hierarchically organised unimodal systems in higher-level multimodal areas. This information takes the form of bottom-up “surprise” signals from unimodal sensory systems that are explained away by top-down processes that minimise the level of surprise across the brain. We present evidence that this theoretical perspective may account for the findings of psychological and neuroimaging investigations into self-recognition and particularly evidence that representations of the self are malleable, rather than fixed as previous accounts of self-recognition might suggest.

Authors: Apps, M; Tsakiris, M

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Journal: Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews
• Volume: 41
• Pages: 85–97
• Publication date: 2013-02-15
• Acceptance date: 2013-01-28
• DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.01.029
• EISSN: 1873-7528
• ISSN: 0149-7634
• Language: English
• Keywords: rubber hand illusion; self-recognition; self-awareness; body ownership; prediction error; Bayesian; enfacement; free energy; voice recognition; face recognition;; predictive coding