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Traps in the Measurement of Independence and Accountability of Central Banks.

Abstract:

Measures of central banks' independence and central banks' accountability which are based on an interpretation of their statutes provide, in themselves, no guidance for the assessment of legislative proposals. In the effectiveness of monetary policy, the crucial considerations relate to how central banks and other policymakers behave. The pattern of incentives is not determined by the statutes, which may be wholly irrelevant, and therefore one cannot discover the effectiveness of policy by in...

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Authors


James Forder More by this author
Volume:
23
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2000
URN:
uuid:ed408a9e-9cc1-467d-93c3-f28120f6a8be
Local pid:
ora:1059
Language:
English

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