Psychopaths and blame : the argument from content

Journal article

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.

Authors: Levy, N

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Routledge
• Journal: Philosophical Psychology
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 351-367
• Publication date: 2014-06-01
• Edition: Publisher's version
• DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.729485
• EISSN: 1465-394X
• ISSN: 0951-5089
• Language: English
• Keywords: psychopathy; blame; mental time travel; moral knowledge; personhood
• Subjects: Ethics (Moral philosophy); Ethics of the biosciences; Philosophy; Practical ethics