Journal article
No best world: moral luck
- Abstract:
- William Rowe and others argue that if ours is a possible world than which there is a better, it follows that God does not exist. If this is correct, then if there is no best possible world, it is not so much as possible that God exist. I reject the key premise of Rowe's argument. The key to seeing that it is false, I suggest, is seeing that God is subject to something fairly called moral luck. In this first part of the article, I set up Rowe's argument, indicate my strategy, introduce the notion of moral luck and show how it bears on Rowe's claims.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Version of record, bin, 115.3KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1017/S0034412505007584
Authors
- Publisher:
- Cambridge University Press
- Journal:
- Religious Studies More from this journal
- Volume:
- 41
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 165-181
- Publication date:
- 2005-06-01
- Edition:
- Publisher's version
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1469-901X
- ISSN:
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0034-4125
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- UUID:
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uuid:ec363e66-005b-4b6a-81ec-1102463ca260
- Local pid:
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ora:1484
- Deposit date:
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2008-03-14
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Cambridge University Press
- Copyright date:
- 2005
- Notes:
- Citation: Leftow, B. (2005). 'No best world: moral luck', Religious Studies, 41(2), 165-181.[ Available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=RES].
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