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Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives.

Abstract:

It is well known that comparative performance information (CPI) can enhance efficiency in static principal-agent relationships by improving the trade-off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts. In dynamic settings, however, there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives (e.g. managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation). We show that the dynamic effects of CPI on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar (static) in...

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Authors


Margaret A. Meyer More by this author
John Vickers More by this author
Volume:
1107
Publication date:
1995
URN:
uuid:ebb593a7-104f-4281-8042-8116920044fe
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11623
Language:
English

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