Dirty hands defended

Journal article

This paper defends the possibility of dirty hands against the longstanding skepticism that an action cannot be simultaneously right and wrong and that dirty hands cases are therefore impossible. While skeptics are right to recognize that prima facie reasons against violating moral duties may be overridden, they are wrong to deny that actions required by necessity may nevertheless remain wrong. Dirty hands cases capture the simultaneous necessity of disregarding moral duties in certain circumstances and the reprehensibility of wronging people even in cases in which this is all-things-considered permissible. Rather than indicating any deficiency in our moral reasoning, the capacity to accommodate the possibility of dirty hands, along with the reality of moral conflict, is a strength of a moral theory.

Authors: Eggert, L

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Brill Academic Publishers
• Journal: Journal of Moral Philosophy
• Volume: 22
• Issue: 1-2
• Pages: 1–20
• Publication date: 2023-06-28
• Acceptance date: 2023-04-19
• DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234097
• EISSN: 1745-5243
• ISSN: 1740-4681
• Language: English
• Keywords: moral remainder; dirty hands; consequentialism; moral conflicts