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Pricing multi-unit markets

Abstract:

We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed with posted prices, under a range of assumptions about the designer's information and agents' valuations. Our results provide insights about the relative power of uniform and non-uniform prices, the relative difficulty of different valuation classes, and th...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer rviewed
Version:
Accepted manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_10

Authors


Feldman, M More by this author
Roughgarden, T More by this author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS Division
Department:
Computer Science
Israel Science Foundation More from this funder
Publisher:
Springer Publisher's website
Publication date:
2018-11-21
Acceptance date:
2018-09-24
DOI:
Pubs id:
pubs:943632
URN:
uri:ea236999-99a2-4e45-89fa-2fb5786c82c1
UUID:
uuid:ea236999-99a2-4e45-89fa-2fb5786c82c1
Local pid:
pubs:943632

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