Journal article
Maxims and thick ethical concepts
- Abstract:
- I begin with Kant's notion of a maxim and consider the role which this notion plays in Kant's formulations of the fundamental categorical imperative. This raises the question of what a maxim is, and why there is not the same requirement for resolutions of other kinds to be universalizable. Drawing on Bernard Williams' notion of a thick ethical concept, I proffer an answer to this question which is intended neither in a spirit of simple exegesis nor as a straightforward exercise in moral philosophy but as something that is poised somewhere between the two. My aim is to provide a kind of rational reconstruction of Kant. In the final section of the essay, I argue that this reconstruction, while it manages to salvage something distinctively Kantian, also does justice to the relativism involved in what J. L. Mackie calls 'people's adherence to and participation in different ways of life'.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00315.x
Authors
- Publisher:
- Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Journal:
- Ratio More from this journal
- Volume:
- 19
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 129-147
- Publication date:
- 2006-06-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1467-9329
- ISSN:
-
0034-0006
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:e97bbbb4-dbc4-4275-8f55-26fc3cd908c2
- Local pid:
-
ora:4367
- Deposit date:
-
2010-11-04
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Moore, A
- Copyright date:
- 2006
- Notes:
- The full-text of this article is not available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this page. Citation: Moore, A. W. (2006). 'Maxims and thick ethical concepts', Ratio 19(2), 129-147. The definitive version of the article is available at http://www.wiley.com/bw/submit.asp?ref=0034-0006&site=1]. © 2006 A. W. Moore.
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record