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When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action.

Abstract:

This paper studies n-player collective-action games in which a public good is produced if and only if m or more volunteers contribute to it. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team of m players successfully provide, and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails. A full characterisation of long-run play reveals the determinants of success. These include the correlation between players' costs of provision and their valuations for the g...

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Publisher:
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2006-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:e92b7d04-1022-455d-8924-88dbfc05fb39
Local pid:
ora:1308
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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