Journal article
Stalnaker on sensuous knowledge
- Abstract:
- Robert Stalnaker has recently argued that a pair of natural thoughts are incompatible. One of them is the view that items of non-indexical factual knowledge rule out possibilities. The other is the view that knowing what sensuous experience is like involves non-indexical knowledge of its phenomenal character. I argue against Stalnaker's take on things, elucidating along the way how our knowledge of what experience is like fits together with the natural idea that items of non-indexical factual knowledge rule out possibilities.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Access Document
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/s11098-005-5383-6
Authors
- Publisher:
- Springer
- Journal:
- Philosophical Studies More from this journal
- Volume:
- 137
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 183-203
- Publication date:
- 2008-01-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1573-0883
- ISSN:
-
0031-8116
- Language:
-
English
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:e87cd952-fb7e-47da-9e60-e8c940dcc45f
- Local pid:
-
ora:3739
- Deposit date:
-
2010-05-07
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Springer
- Copyright date:
- 2006
- Notes:
- N.B. Dr Sturgeon is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford. The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page. Citation: Sturgeon, S. (2008). 'Stalnaker on sensuous knowledge', Philosophical Studies, 137(2), 183-203. [Available at springerlink.com].
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