Stalnaker on sensuous knowledge
- Robert Stalnaker has recently argued that a pair of natural thoughts are incompatible. One of them is the view that items of non-indexical factual knowledge rule out possibilities. The other is the view that knowing what sensuous experience is like involves non-indexical knowledge of its phenomenal character. I argue against Stalnaker's take on things, elucidating along the way how our knowledge of what experience is like fits together with the natural idea that items of non-indexical factual knowledge rule out possibilities.
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- N.B. Dr Sturgeon is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford. The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page. Citation: Sturgeon, S. (2008). 'Stalnaker on sensuous knowledge', Philosophical Studies, 137(2), 183-203. [Available at springerlink.com].