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Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidence

Abstract:

We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed "watchdog" agents can implement institutionally preferred policies. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. Our model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. Howeve...

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Thomas Noe More by this author
Ann Gillette More by this author
Michael Rebello More by this author
Publication date:
2003
URN:
uuid:e859d83f-7f96-40b1-a86e-9254bd58a33e
Local pid:
oai:eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk:1114

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