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Thesis

Incentives, reputation and learning

Abstract:

Many economic interactions are characterized by imperfect information and imperfect enforcement. This thesis analyzes the use and the effectiveness of incentives, reputation and learning and how economic agents use them to mitigate the problems caused by both.

Chapter 1 presents experimental evidence on the use of price incentives and reputational incentives from gift-exchange game lab experiments in Ghana and the United Kingdom. While in the United Kingdom, like in other experiment...

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Role:
Supervisor
Role:
Supervisor
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Grant:
ES/J500112/1
Funding agency for:
Project
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
University of Oxford
Language:
English

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