Journal article

Skew-Symmetry under Simultaneous Revisions.

Abstract:: Invariant selection of the risk-dominant equilibrium of evolutionary coordination games with "skew-symmetric" noise processes is extended to the case of simultaneous strategy revisions.

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APA Style

Norman, T. (2009). Skew-Symmetry under Simultaneous Revisions. International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 11(4), 471–478.

MLA Style

Norman, T. “Skew-Symmetry under Simultaneous Revisions.” International Game Theory Review (IGTR), vol. 11, no. 4, World Scientific, 2009, pp. 471–78.

Chicago Style

Norman, T. 2009. “Skew-Symmetry under Simultaneous Revisions.” International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 11 (4): 471–78.
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Publisher copy:: 10.1142/S0219198909002455

Authors

+ Norman, T More by this author

Role:: Author

Publisher:: World Scientific
Journal:: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) More from this journal
Volume:: 11
Issue:: 4
Pages:: 471 - 478
Publication date:: 2009-01-01
DOI:: 10.1142/S0219198909002455

Language:: English
UUID:: uuid:e43597bf-4f64-4bb9-8722-751d48c4fcce
Local pid:: oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:15378
Deposit date:: 2013-04-20

Terms of use

Copyright date:: 2009

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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