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Working paper

Pandering judges

Abstract:

Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be indifferent to the concerns of the elctorate and, as a result, potentially lacking in discipline but unlikely to pander to public opinion. We investigate this proposition empirically using data on promotion decisions taken by senior English judges between 1985 and 2005. Throughout this period the popular view was one of ill-disciplined elitism: senior judges were alleged to be favouring candidates from elite backgrounds over th...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford Publisher's website
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2008-04-01
Pubs id:
585761
Local pid:
pubs:585761
Paper number:
390

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