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Supermajority Voting Rules: Balancing Commitment and Flexibility.

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APA Style

Bó, E. (2002). Supermajority Voting Rules: Balancing Commitment and Flexibility. Department of Economics (University of Oxford).

MLA Style

Bó, E. “Supermajority Voting Rules: Balancing Commitment and Flexibility.” Department of Economics (University of Oxford), 2002. Discussion Paper Series.

Chicago Style

Bó, E. 2002. “Supermajority Voting Rules: Balancing Commitment and Flexibility.” Discussion Paper Series. Department of Economics (University of Oxford).
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+ Bó, E More by this author

Role:: Author

Publisher:: Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:: Discussion paper series
Publication date:: 2002-01-01

UUID:: uuid:e116a48e-2c9f-432e-a30e-d42e6c1ad8b4
Local pid:: ora:1169
Deposit date:: 2011-08-16
ARK identifier:: ark:/29072/ora_e116a48e2c9f432ea30ed42e6c1ad8b4

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Copyright date:: 2002

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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