The People’s Court: Dissonant Institutionalization and Judicial Populism in Pakistan

Journal article

What is a populist judge, and when do judges embrace populism? Populist judges bypass legal and procedural constraints, seek an unmediated relationship with the public, and claim to represent the public better than political elites. Judicial populism can emerge in response to institutionalized dissonance in the political system. Dissonant institutionalization facilitates contestation between state institutions and can undermine the legitimacy of political institutions. This legitimacy crisis can imbue judges with a belief in their role as representatives of the public interest. In Pakistan, the dissonance caused by unresolved differences between the civil-military bureaucracy and the elected political leadership—differences that were embedded into the constitutional framework, facilitated the rise of judicial populism. I outline the key features of judicial populism and study the dynamics surrounding the rapid expansion of populist jurisprudence between 2005 and 2019 in Pakistan, with a focus on public interest litigation that became the cornerstone of the judiciary’s populist turn. Through case analysis, archival research, and semi-structured interviews, I discuss features of the populist approach to jurisprudence and trace how dissonance within Pakistan’s political system created new opportunities for the judiciary and changed judicial role conceptions within the legal and judicial community.

Authors: Kureshi, Y

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Journal: Law & Social Inquiry
• Volume: 51
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 79-110
• Publication date: 2024-11-29
• Acceptance date: 2024-08-09
• DOI: 10.1017/lsi.2024.49
• EISSN: 1747-4469
• ISSN: 0897-6546
• Language: English
• Keywords: judges; Pakistan; populism; South Asia; corruption; judiciary