Journal article
International R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment
- Abstract:
- We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D; and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D; subsidy and welfare are higher when government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment thus yields welfare gains (though they are small) but so does unanticipated reneging, whereas reneging which is anticipated by firms yields the lowest welfare of all.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Authors
- Publisher:
- Blackwell Publishing
- Journal:
- Review of International Economics More from this journal
- Volume:
- 4
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 322-338
- Publication date:
- 1996-10-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1467-9396
- ISSN:
-
0965-7576
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Blackwell Publishers Ltd
- Copyright date:
- 1996
- Notes:
- N.B. Professor Neary was based at University College Dublin when this article was first published. The full-text of this article is not available in ORA at this time. Citation: Leahy, D. & Neary, J. P. (1996). 'International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment', Review of International Economics, 4(3), 322-338. [The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com].
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record