Review of David Boonin, Beyond Roe: Why Abortion Should be Legal Even if the Fetus is a Person (Oxford University Press, 2019)

Journal article

Should abortion be legal even if the human fetus is a person? "Person" is intended here in its philosophical sense, to mean a being possessed of equal moral standing and rights as you and me. Most importantly of all, a person is a being with the fundamental right to life. The question about what follows morally and legally when fetal personhood is presumed has occupied a sizeable part of abortion ethics for some time. Far and away the most influential reflection on that question was the philosopher Judith Thomson's "violinist analogy argument" in defence of abortion rights. 1 There, Thomson argued that abortion is morally defensible even if it is true that the fetus is a rights-holding person. Her argument rested on a view of pregnancy as supererogatory, and, conversely, of abortion as the mere refusal to be a good Samaritan. Though it might be laudable to do so, no one is morally required to surrender her very body in order to keep another person alive for nine months, Thomson claimed. Ergo, even if fetuses are persons, women are not morally obliged to provide them with life-saving bodily aid by gestating them. They are morally permitted to refuse that bodily aid by means of abortion. They are permitted to choose not to be good Samaritans.

Authors: Greasley, K

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Springer
• Journal: Criminal Law and Philosophy
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 535-544
• Publication date: 2021-05-14
• DOI: 10.1007/s11572-021-09580-x
• EISSN: 1871-9805
• ISSN: 1871-9791
• Language: English
• Keywords: Abortion; Political science; Pregnancy; Comparative law; Philosophy of law; Law; Sociology