Incentive ratios of Fisher markets

Conference item

In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most e1/e ≈ 1.445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight.

Authors: Chen, N; Deng, X; Zhang, H; Zhang, J

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• Host title: Automata, Languages, and Programming : 39th International Colloquium, ICALP 2012, Warwick, UK, July 9-13, 2012, Proceedings, Part II
• Pages: 464-475
• Series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• Series number: 7392
• Publication date: 2012-06-23
• Event title: 39th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2012)
• Event location: University of Warwick, Warwick, UK
• Event website: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/dimap/icalp2012/
• Event start date: 2012-07-09
• Event end date: 2012-07-13
• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42
• ISSN: 0302-9743
• ISBN: 9783642315855
• Language: English