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Incentive ratios of Fisher markets

Abstract:

In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most ...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, MPLS, Computer Science
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg Publisher's website
Volume:
7392
Pages:
464-475
Publication date:
2012-01-01
DOI:
ISSN:
0302-9743
URN:
uuid:dda40eca-dcfa-42fc-8360-5f089557e2a0
Source identifiers:
574317
Local pid:
pubs:574317
ISBN:
978-3-642-31585-5

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