Conference item icon

Conference item

Incentive ratios of Fisher markets

Abstract:

In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most ...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg Publisher's website
Volume:
7392
Pages:
464-475
Host title:
Automata, Languages, and Programming : 39th International Colloquium, ICALP 2012, Warwick, UK, July 9-13, 2012, Proceedings, Part II
Publication date:
2012-01-01
DOI:
ISSN:
0302-9743
Source identifiers:
574317
ISBN:
9783642315855
Pubs id:
pubs:574317
UUID:
uuid:dda40eca-dcfa-42fc-8360-5f089557e2a0
Local pid:
pubs:574317
Deposit date:
2015-11-17

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP