The C account of assertion: a negative result

Journal article

Tyler Burge notably offers a truth‐first account of perceptual entitlement in terms of a priori necessary representational functions and norms: on his account, epistemic normativity turns on natural norms, which turn on representational functions. This paper has two aims: first, it criticises Tyler Burge's truth‐first a priori derivation on functionalist and value‐theoretic grounds. Second, it develops a novel, knowledge‐first a priori derivation of perceptual entitlement. According to the view developed here, it is a priori that we are entitled to believe the deliverances of our perceptual belief formation system, in virtue of the latter's constitutive function of generating knowledge

Authors: Kelp, C; Simion, M

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Springer
• Journal: Synthese
• Volume: 197
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 125-137
• Publication date: 2018-03-28
• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-1760-5
• EISSN: 1573-0964
• ISSN: 0039-7857
• Language: English
• Keywords: Philosophy of language; Epistemology; Philosophy of science; Philosophy; Metaphysics; Property (philosophy); Assertion; Programming language; Computer science