Journal article
Bioconservatism, partiality, and the human nature objection to enhancement
- Abstract:
- ‘Bioconservatives’ in the human enhancement debate endorse the conservative claim that we should reject the use of biotechnologies that enhance natural human capacities. However, they often ground their objections to enhancement with contestable claims about human nature that are also in tension with other common tenets of conservatism. We argue that bioconservatives could raise a more plausible objection to enhancement by invoking a strain of conservative thought developed by G.A. Cohen. Although Cohen’s conservatism is not sufficient to fully revive the bioconservative objection, we argue that it can be supplemented by an account of reasonable partiality for humanity in a way that provides further support to the bioconservative position in a manner congruous with broader conservatism. We propose that the idea of partiality to humanity can buttress the bioconservative objection into its strongest possible form. However, we conclude by arguing that, even in this form, the objection cannot do all the work that bioconservatives expect of it.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 275.9KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/monist/onw013
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Monist More from this journal
- Volume:
- 99
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 406-422
- Publication date:
- 2017-01-28
- Acceptance date:
- 2016-10-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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2153-3601
- ISSN:
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0026-9662
- Pubs id:
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pubs:648632
- UUID:
-
uuid:db9614d5-2eff-4de7-b5cc-81957d32583a
- Local pid:
-
pubs:648632
- Source identifiers:
-
648632
- Deposit date:
-
2016-10-11
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Kahane et al
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- Copyright © The Authors 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Hegeler Institute. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Oxford University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onw013
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