Journal article
Counterparts and actuality
- Abstract:
- Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue that no coherent version of counterpart theory can provide a plausible representation of talk about actuality, and so, we conclude, counterpart theory should be rejected.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/mind/fzi001
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Mind More from this journal
- Volume:
- 114
- Issue:
- 453
- Pages:
- 1-30
- Publication date:
- 2005-01-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1460-2113
- ISSN:
-
0026-4423
- Language:
-
English
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:daa57c9f-b912-4d2e-bb88-ed3ad310b68d
- Local pid:
-
ora:4078
- Deposit date:
-
2010-08-18
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Michael Fara & Tim Williamson
- Copyright date:
- 2005
- Notes:
- The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page.
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