Journal article icon

Journal article

The impossibility of a moral right to privacy

Abstract:

This paper clarifies and defends against criticism our argument in Unfit for the Future that there is no moral right to privacy. A right to privacy is conceived as a right that others do not acquire information about us that we reserve for ourselves and selected others. Information acquisition itself is distinguished from the means used to acquire it and the uses to which the information is put. To acquire information is not an action; it is to be caused to be in an internal state. By contrast, means of acquisition and uses of information are actions that can be voluntarily controlled. We can therefore have rights against others that they stay away from certain means and uses but not from information acquisition in itself. An omniscient, omnipotent and omnibeneficient being is not thought to violate a right to privacy because its means and uses of information are morally acceptable.

Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

Actions

Access Document

Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1007/s12152-022-09500-3

Authors

More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Uehiro Institute
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Oxford college:
St Cross College
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0003-1691-6403


More from this funder
Funder identifier:
https://ror.org/029chgv08
Grant:
WT203132


Publisher:
Springer
Journal:
Neuroethics More from this journal
Volume:
15
Issue:
2
Article number:
23
Publication date:
2022-06-28
Acceptance date:
2022-06-08
DOI:
EISSN:
1874-5504
ISSN:
1874-5490
Pmid:
35784396


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1268022
Local pid:
pubs:1268022
Deposit date:
2025-01-14
ARK identifier:

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP