Journal article
Knowability and constructivism
- Abstract:
- If anti-realism is defined as the principle that all truths are knowable, then anti-realists have a reason to revise logic. For an argument first published by Fitch seems to reduce anti-realism to absurdity within classical but not constructivist logic. One might try to sever this link between anti-realism and revisionism in logic by giving either a modified version of anti-realism not vulnerable to Fitch's argument within classical logic or a modified version of Fitch's argument to which anti-realism is vulnerable within constructivist logic.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Authors
Contributors
+ The Scots Philosophical Association
- Role:
- Other
+ University of St Andrews
- Role:
- Other
- Publisher:
- Blackwell Publishing
- Journal:
- Philosophical Quarterly More from this journal
- Volume:
- 38
- Issue:
- 153
- Pages:
- 422-432
- Publication date:
- 1988-10-01
- EISSN:
-
1467-9213
- ISSN:
-
0031-8094
- Language:
-
English
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:d70faee9-ee55-453e-a769-c6957a87c849
- Local pid:
-
ora:5100
- Deposit date:
-
2011-03-10
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Copyright date:
- 1988
- Notes:
- Citation: Williamson, T. (1988). 'Knowability and Constructivism', The Philosophical Quarterly 38(153), 422-432. [The definitive version of the article is available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219707]. © 1988 The Philsophical Quarterly. The full-text of this article is not available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page. N.B. Prof Williamson is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford.
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