The argument from almost indiscernibles

Journal article

What I call the argument from almost indiscernibles is an argument, put forward by Robert Adams in 1979, for the possibility of indiscernibles based on the possibility of almost indiscernibles. The argument is that if almost indiscernibles are possible, indiscernibles are possible, but since almost indiscernible are possible, indiscernibles are possible. The argument seems to be an improvement over the mere appeal to intuitions, like that suggested by Max Black, that situations in which there are indiscernibles are possible, for the argument purports to give us a reason that indiscernibles are possible. In this paper I shall assess the argument by examining whether there is support for the conditional premise that if almost indiscernibles are possible, indiscernibles are possible. I shall argue that there are reasons to think that either the premise lacks support or almost indiscernibles are dispensable. If the premise lacks support, the argument does not establish the possibility of almost indiscernibles; if almost indiscernibles are dispensable, the argument is not needed to establish the possibility of indiscernibles.

Authors: Rodriguez-Pereyra, G

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Springer Netherlands
• Journal: Philosophical Studies
• Volume: 174
• Issue: 12
• Pages: 3005–3020
• Publication date: 2016-12-10
• Acceptance date: 2016-11-22
• DOI: 10.1007/s11098-016-0843-8
• EISSN: 1573-0883
• ISSN: 0031-8116
• Keywords: almost indiscernibles; Robert Adams; identity of indiscernibles