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Consumer information and the limits to competition

Abstract:

This paper studies competition between firms when consumers observe a pri-vate signal of their preferences over products. Within the class of signal structures which allow pure-strategy pricing equilibria, we derive signal structures which are optimal for firms and those which are optimal for consumers. The firm-optimal signal structure amplifies the underlying product differentiation, thereby relax¬ing competition, while ensuring that consumers purchase their preferred product, thereby ...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2019-11-28
Paper number:
888
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1087406
Local pid:
pubs:1087406
Deposit date:
2020-12-14

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