Journal article
Concept‐metacognition
- Abstract:
- Concepts are our tools for thinking. They enable us to engage in explicit reasoning about things in the world. Like physical tools, they can be more or less good, given the ways we use them—more or less dependable for categorisation, learning, induction, action‐planning, and so on. Do concept users appreciate, explicitly or implicitly, that concepts vary in dependability? Do they feel that some concepts are in some way defective? If so, we metacognise our concepts. This article offers a preliminary taxonomy of different forms of metacognition directed at concepts and suggests that concept‐metacognition impacts on several different cognitive processes.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Version of record, pdf, 1.0MB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1111/mila.12235
Authors
- Publisher:
- Wiley
- Journal:
- Mind and Language More from this journal
- Volume:
- 35
- Issue:
- 5
- Pages:
- 565-582
- Publication date:
- 2019-05-01
- Acceptance date:
- 2019-01-23
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1468-0017
- ISSN:
-
0268-1064
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:965896
- UUID:
-
uuid:d3dc24a1-cc26-4024-9f26-3ef2f54d3f60
- Local pid:
-
pubs:965896
- Source identifiers:
-
965896
- Deposit date:
-
2019-01-25
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Nicholas Shea
- Copyright date:
- 2019
- Rights statement:
- © 2019 The Author. Mind & Language published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record