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Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof

Abstract:

A widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the defa...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1080/00455091.2018.1512819

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Oxford college:
Exeter College
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0001-8778-524X
Publisher:
Routledge Publisher's website
Journal:
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Journal website
Volume:
49
Issue:
2
Pages:
230-252
Publication date:
2018-08-28
Acceptance date:
2018-08-12
DOI:
EISSN:
1911-0820
ISSN:
0045-5091
Source identifiers:
905559
Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:905559
UUID:
uuid:d1b6001f-7bb0-468f-bba7-e295624700e4
Local pid:
pubs:905559
Deposit date:
2018-08-13

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