Journal article
Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof
- Abstract:
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A widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the defa...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Accepted manuscript, pdf, 216.2KB)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1080/00455091.2018.1512819
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Routledge Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy Journal website
- Volume:
- 49
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 230-252
- Publication date:
- 2018-08-28
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-08-12
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1911-0820
- ISSN:
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0045-5091
- Source identifiers:
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905559
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:905559
- UUID:
-
uuid:d1b6001f-7bb0-468f-bba7-e295624700e4
- Local pid:
- pubs:905559
- Deposit date:
- 2018-08-13
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Rights statement:
- Copyright © 2018 Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
- Notes:
-
This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1512819
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