How nudging upsets autonomy

Journal article

Everyone suspects that nudging offends against the nudged’s autonomy. But it has proved rather difficult to say why. In this paper I offer a new diagnosis of the tension between even the best cases of nudging and the value of autonomy. Relying on the distinction between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as non-alienation, I show that nudging need not offend against either. But it does sever the tie between them, it undermines the possibility of achieving non-alienation *in virtue of* having sovereignty. Analogies to common themes in virtue epistemology help to establish this point. If true, this diagnosis improves our understanding of nudging, of course, but it also improves our understanding of the value of autonomy—the full value of autonomy has the structure that is shared by many other achievements—that of an objective element, a subjective one, and the appropriate relations between the two.

Authors: Enoch, D

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
• Journal: Journal of Philosophy
• Volume: 121
• Issue: 12
• Pages: 657-685
• Publication date: 2024-12-01
• Acceptance date: 2023-04-26
• DOI: 10.5840/jphil20241211241
• EISSN: 1939-8549
• ISSN: 0022-362X
• Language: English