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Credible Deviations from Signaling Equilibria.

Abstract:

In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be "unambiguously" interpreted as coming from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Receiver could form over that set. We show that this idea characterizes a unique equilibrium outcome in two classes of games. First, in monotonic signaling games, only the Riley outcome is immune to this sort of deviation. Our result th...

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Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1007/s00182-009-0161-x

Authors


Publisher:
Springer
Journal:
International Journal of Game Theory
Volume:
38
Issue:
3
Pages:
411 - 430
Publication date:
2009-11-01
DOI:
ISSN:
0020-7276
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:d1128352-abe5-42af-955c-ec16e9494209
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14788
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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