Journal article
Credible Deviations from Signaling Equilibria.
- Abstract:
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In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be "unambiguously" interpreted as coming from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Receiver could form over that set. We show that this idea characterizes a unique equilibrium outcome in two classes of games. First, in monotonic signaling games, only the Riley outcome is immune to this sort of deviation. Our result th...
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(pdf, 234.1KB)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/s00182-009-0161-x
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Springer
- Journal:
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Volume:
- 38
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 411 - 430
- Publication date:
- 2009-11-01
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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0020-7276
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- UUID:
-
uuid:d1128352-abe5-42af-955c-ec16e9494209
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14788
- Deposit date:
- 2011-08-16
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- Copyright date:
- 2009
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