Journal article
Sponge
- Abstract:
- Competition law is often perceived as a stable discipline. In fact, one is often reminded that competition law must be based on economic considerations and reject external social, or political objectives. This paper argues that this appealing view – which embodies a sense of purity – is merely an illusion. It ignores the ‘sponge-like’ characteristics of the law – its susceptibility to national peculiarities originating in its design and evident in its application and its exposure to intellectual and regulatory capture. While the idea of a stable, predictable and economically-based antitrust discipline is in all of our interests, these traits are not inherent to the law. They are forced onto the sponge in an attempt to ‘discipline’ its natural tendencies, and propagated as reality, to support its legitimacy.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 735.9KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/jaenfo/jnw011
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Journal of Antitrust Enforcement More from this journal
- Volume:
- 5
- Issue:
- 1
- Pages:
- 49-75
- Publication date:
- 2016-09-28
- Acceptance date:
- 2016-08-31
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
2050-0696
- ISSN:
-
2050-0688
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:645716
- UUID:
-
uuid:d0d1542c-7b76-411b-8eff-c7a017875973
- Local pid:
-
pubs:645716
- Source identifiers:
-
645716
- Deposit date:
-
2016-09-20
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Ezrachi, A
- Copyright date:
- 2016
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2016 The Author. Published by Oxford University Press. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Oxford University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnw011
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record