Journal article
Essentially stable matchings
- Abstract:
- We propose a solution to the conflict between fairness and efficiency in one-sided matching markets. A matching is essentially stable if any priority-based claim initiates a chain of reassignments that results in the initial claimant losing the object. We show that an essentially stable and Pareto efficient matching always exists and that Kesten's (2010) EADA mechanism always selects one while other common Pareto efficient mechanisms do not. Additionally, we show that there exists a student-pessimal essentially stable matching and that the Rural Hospital Theorem extends to essential stability. Finally, we analyze the incentive properties of essentially stable mechanisms.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Access Document
- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, 457.2KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.009
Authors
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Journal:
- Games and Economic Behavior More from this journal
- Volume:
- 120
- Pages:
- 370-390
- Publication date:
- 2020-02-10
- Acceptance date:
- 2020-01-27
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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0899-8256
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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1086853
- Local pid:
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pubs:1086853
- Deposit date:
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2020-02-11
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier Inc.
- Copyright date:
- 2020
- Rights statement:
- © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
- Notes:
-
This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available from Elsevier at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.009
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