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New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, "Toxic Asset" Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions.

Abstract:

I describe a new static (sealed-bid) auction for multiple substitute goods. As in a two-sided simultaneous multiple round auction (SMRA), bidders bid on multiple assets simultaneously, and bid-takers choose supply functions across assets. The auction yields more efficiency, revenue, information, and trade than running multiple separate auctions, but is often simpler to use and understand, and less vulnerable to collusion, than a SMRA. I designed it after the 2007 Northern Rock bank run to hel...

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Paul Klemperer More by this author
Volume:
2009-W06
Series:
Economics Working Papers
Publication date:
2009
URN:
uuid:cd49376f-8b82-460d-bb3c-773c312d8e40
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14668
Language:
English

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