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Journal article

Believing in compatibilism

Abstract:

In this response, I argue that we do not need to appeal to incompatibilist conceptions of agency to understand how belief formation and revision can be agential. When our belief formation mechanisms are appropriately reasons responsive and reactive, they partially constitute our agency, but such reasons responsiveness does not require indeterminism. For similar reasons, I deny that our responding appropriately and mechanistically to evidence constitutes our being forced to our beliefs: rather...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
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Name:
Wellcome Trust
Grant:
WT104848/Z/14/Z
Publisher:
University of Oviedo
Journal:
Teorema More from this journal
Volume:
37
Issue:
2
Pages:
127-138
Publication date:
2018-05-20
Acceptance date:
2018-03-09
ISSN:
0210-1602
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:854275
UUID:
uuid:ca4e8c52-d12a-425f-a490-3b514fad2071
Local pid:
pubs:854275
Source identifiers:
854275
Deposit date:
2018-06-27

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