Book section
Moral Neuroenhancement
- Abstract:
- In this chapter, we introduce the notion of “moral neuroenhancement,” offering a novel definition as well as spelling out three conditions under which we expect that such neuroenhancement would be most likely to be permissible (or even desirable). Furthermore, we draw a distinction between first-order moral capacities, which we suggest are less promising targets for neurointervention, and second-order moral capacities, which we suggest are more promising. We conclude by discussing concerns that moral neuroenhancement might restrict freedom or otherwise “misfire,” and argue that these concerns are not as damning as they may seem at first.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 418.3KB, Terms of use)
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Authors
- Publisher:
- Routledge
- Host title:
- Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics
- Publication date:
- 2017-07-14
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:641547
- UUID:
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uuid:c8bda690-ea87-4aec-9155-c3e786f100ce
- Local pid:
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pubs:641547
- Deposit date:
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2016-09-05
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Taylor & Francis
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- © 2018 Taylor & Francis. This is the Accepted Manuscript version of the chapter. The final version is available online at: https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Neuroethics-1st-Edition/Johnson-Rommelfanger/p/book/9781138898295
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