Journal article
Search quality and revenue cannibalization by competing search engines
- Abstract:
-
Consumers are attracted by high-quality search results. Search engines, though, essentially compete against themselves because consumers are induced to substitute away from advertisement links when their organic counterparts are of high quality. I characterize the effect of such revenue cannibalization upon equilibrium quality when search engines compete for clicks. Cannibalization provides an incentive for quality degradation, engendering low-quality equilibria-even when provision is costles...
Expand abstract
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Authors
Funding
Economic and Social Research Council
More from this funder
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Wiley Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Journal of Economics and Management Strategy Journal website
- Volume:
- 22
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 445-467
- Publication date:
- 2013-01-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1530-9134
- ISSN:
-
1058-6407
Item Description
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:426651
- UUID:
-
uuid:c8b7d462-c5f8-4311-a90b-8f2ca0d8ec52
- Local pid:
- pubs:426651
- Source identifiers:
-
426651
- Deposit date:
- 2015-10-26
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Wiley Periodicals, Inc
- Copyright date:
- 2013
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Taylor, G. (2013), Search Quality and Revenue Cannibalization by Competing Search Engines. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 22: 445–467., which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12027. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
- Licence:
- Other
Metrics
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record