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Journal article

“Fatal attraction” and level-k thinking in games with non-neutral frames

Abstract:

Traditional game theory assumes that if framing does not affect a game’s payoffs, it will not influence behavior. However, Rubinstein and Tversky (1993), Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller (1996), and Rubinstein (1999) reported experiments eliciting initial responses to hide-and-seek and other types of game, in which subjects’ behavior responded systematically to non-neutral framing via decision labelings. Crawford and Iriberri (2007ab) proposed a level-k explanation of Rubinstein et al.’s resul...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.jebo.2018.10.008

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Oxford college:
All Souls College
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0003-0532-0305
University of California, San Diego More from this funder
All Souls College, Oxford More from this funder
Publisher:
Elsevier Publisher's website
Journal:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Journal website
Volume:
156
Pages:
219-224
Publication date:
2018-11-08
Acceptance date:
2018-10-22
DOI:
ISSN:
0167-2681
Source identifiers:
930572
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:930572
UUID:
uuid:c8b6ed8f-f8c1-4411-8877-b2c618ec3a4c
Local pid:
pubs:930572
Deposit date:
2018-10-23

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