Varieties of punitiveness: the political economy of punishment in advanced democracies

Thesis

This dissertation advances and connects literatures from the comparative political economy, social policy and carceral state traditions in asking when and why governments pursue more punitive policies intended to control crime and other social ills. The work analyzes punitiveness as a concept independent from both crime and incarceration. Perhaps against expectation, incarceration rates do not uniformly track crime rates across countries or within countries over time. Similarly, states often treat like crimes with highly varied packages of prison sentences and rehabilitative measures. Such cross-national and sub-national variation remains underexplored, particularly in political science. This work thus develops an original conception of punitiveness, which it measures with a novel index built from the criminal legal codes of 26 countries. To explain the resultant variation, I evaluate both voters’ demand and politicians’ incentives to supply punishment. I propose that we must consider how and when politicians and citizens alike make trade-offs between different policy options for crime control: those that work in a reactive, retributive fashion (punishment and incarceration) or those that work in a proactive, rehabilitative fashion (welfare and social investment). I argue that voters are more likely to emphasize punishment when their income is high and risks of arrest or police victimization are low and to emphasize welfare in the reverse situation. Cross-pressured voters may then form unexpected coalitions when the anti-punishment poor align with the rich who perceive higher positive externalities from welfare when living in high crime and inequality regions. Politicians respond to this variable demand differently based on the incentives created by electoral institutions. Under proportional representation systems, for example, politicians are incentivized to distribute welfare benefits diffusely and thus do not need to politicize crime. In majoritarian systems, conversely, locally-concentrated crime is politicized as electorally beneficial. I have tested these theoretical claims through a multi-methods design with cross-country quantitative analyses and an original public opinion survey alongside fieldwork (archival research and elite interviews) supporting qualitative case studies of Finland and England & Wales.

Authors: Pfeffer, E

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-9eowqj2vz
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: inequality; crime; welfare; electoral systems; legal codes; punishment; comparative political economy; political geography; incarceration; public opinion; punitiveness
• Subjects: Politics and government