Journal article

Banklash: how media coverage of bank scandals moves mass preferences on financial regulation

Abstract:: Financial regulation is often adopted in the wake of scandals and crises. Yet political science has little to say about the political effects of corporate scandals. We break that silence, asking whether exposure to news coverage of bank scandals changes the preferences of voters for financial regulation. Drawing from the literatures on media influence and public opinion, we argue that news coverage of bank scandals should increase voters’ appetite for regulation. We test our hypothesis with data from six countries, using original nationally representative panel surveys with embedded experiments (total N = 27,673). Our pooled and country-specific analyses largely support our expectation that exposure to news coverage of scandals increases regulatory preferences. We reproduce this finding in a separate survey wave, using different scandals than in our original analysis. These results contribute to studies on media influence on public opinion, the political significance of scandals, and the political economy of regulation.

Publication status:: Published

Peer review status:: Peer reviewed

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APA Style

Culpepper, P., Jung, J.-H., & Lee, T. (2023). Banklash: how media coverage of bank scandals moves mass preferences on financial regulation. American Journal of Political Science, 68(2), 427–444.

MLA Style

Culpepper, P., et al. “Banklash: How Media Coverage of Bank Scandals Moves Mass Preferences on Financial Regulation.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 68, no. 2, Wiley, 2023, pp. 427–44.

Chicago Style

Culpepper, P, J-H Jung, and T Lee. 2023. “Banklash: How Media Coverage of Bank Scandals Moves Mass Preferences on Financial Regulation.” American Journal of Political Science 68 (2): 427–44.
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Files:: Culpepper_et_al_2024_Banklash_how_media.pdf

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Publisher copy:: 10.1111/ajps.12752

Authors

+ Culpepper, P More by this author

Institution:: University of Oxford
Division:: SSD
Department:: Blavatnik School of Government
Oxford college:: Nuffield College
Role:: Author
ORCID:: 0000-0001-6227-0813

+ Jung, J-H More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Lee, T More by this author

Role:: Author

Publisher:: Wiley
Journal:: American Journal of Political Science More from this journal
Volume:: 68
Issue:: 2
Pages:: 427-444
Publication date:: 2023-01-14
Acceptance date:: 2022-08-10
DOI:: 10.1111/ajps.12752
EISSN:: 1540-5907
ISSN:: 0092-5853

Language:: English
Pubs id:: 1282889
Local pid:: pubs:1282889
Deposit date:: 2022-10-13

Terms of use

Copyright holder:: Culpepper et al.
Copyright date:: 2023
Rights statement:: © 2023 The Authors. American Journal of Political Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Midwest Political Science Association. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Licence:: CC Attribution (CC BY)

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